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Chapter I
Introduction
Many have seen the harmonization 1 of legal rules among
the countries as the fastest way to strengthen
international trade and the economic globalization process.
In the case of the United States, the consolidation of this
new-world-economic-order seems to be paramount since the
United States is one of the major exporters of goods,
services, and copyrightable works in the world. Therefore,
"in the latter half of the twentieth century, international
copyright protection has become of much greater concern, as
the [copyright] industry has become supranational." 2 For
instance, "in 1990, America's copyright industries recorded
$34 billion in foreign sales of records, CDs, computer
software, motion pictures, music, books, scientific
journals, periodicals, photographs, designs and pictorial
1Thomas Dreier & Silke von Lewinski, The European Commission'
s
Activities in the Field of Copyright, 39 Copyright Society of USA L.J.
96 (1991) (discussing the framework for copyright harmonization within
the European Community, and the state of copyright harmonization by
presenting the legal instruments which so far have been adopted by the
European Council, or which have been proposed or announced by the
European Commission)
.
2Laura A. Pitta, Economic and Moral Rights under U.S. Copyright Law:
Protecting Authors and Producers in the Motion Picture Industry, 12
Entert. & Sports Lawyer 3 , at 3 (1995)
.
2and sculptural works" 3 ; as another example, "American film,
television, record, and music publishing companies now
derive 50 to 60 percent of their revenues from foreign
markets .
"
4
In order to achieve an international framework which
could provide a minimum standard of protection for its
copyrightable works, in 1988, the United States acceded to
the Berne Convention 5 , and Congress passed the Berne
Convention Implementation Act 6 ; moreover, in 1994, the
Congress enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 7 , which
includes the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 8 .
3Arthur R. Miller, Extending Copyrights Preserves U.S. Culture,
Billboard, Jan 14, 1995, at 4.
4Donald E. Biederman et al
.
, Law and Business of the Entertainment
Industries at XV (Praeger ed. , 2d ed. 1992)
.
5Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886 (last revised July 24, 1971),
reprinted in World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(Paris Act, 1971) (1978) [hereinafter Berne Convention]
.
6Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C).
7Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4 809
(1994) [hereinafter GATT]
.
8Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs), reprinted in 33 Intl. Legal Mat. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs] . Under the 'TRIPs 1 agreement " [m] embers shall comply with
articles 1-21 and the Appendix of the Berne Convention. However,
Members shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in
respect of the rights conferred under article 6bis of that Convention
or of the rights derived therefrom." Id., art. 9. Therefore, the
moral rights controversy arises only with regard to the Berne
Convention.
3These treaties provide the highest copyright
protection available at the international level. Indeed,
thanks to these international provisions, global piracy has
declined in the last years. 9 However, the adherence of the
United States to these treaties has caused some controversy
since it "represents a major overhaul of federal law in
many spheres, not simply in copyright." 10 Thus, this
adherence has brought a clash of the two systems involved
in the international copyright field (the copyright and the
author's rights systems) and their philosophies. 11 For
instance, author's rights countries (i.e., France, Germany,
Italy, and most Latin American countries) focus almost
exclusively on the individual creator (the author) 12 , while
the common law countries (i.e., United States and the
United Kingdom) focus on the balance between the author's
property rights and the people's right to learn. 13
9
"Global music piracy declined in 1993 for the first time in more than
a decade." The Hollywood Reporter, Jun 9, 1994, at 1 cited by Donald
E. Biederman et al
.
, Law and Business of the Entertainment Industries
at 7 (Praeger ed. , 3d ed. 1996)
.
10David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1385, at
1385 (1995) .
1:LPitta, supra note 2.
12 Id.
13
"In this balance, the author's interests are generally considered
secondary to the public interest, sometimes even termed a 'means to an
end 1 . For example, the courts at common law developed concepts such
as fair use to prevent the copyright monopoly from defeating its
purpose of ensuring that the public can make use of others'
creations." Harvard Law Review, Visual Artists' Rights in a Digital
Age, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1977, at 1982-1983 (1994) .
4In the copyright field and within the Berne Convention
the differences between national laws and thus between the
author ' s rights approach and the copyright approach hardly
showed up for many years. 14 However, with the growth of
international trade, has also grown an international
emphasis on natural law (at least in the copyright field)
and its own deeply rooted principles of individual
recognition 15 without taking into consideration the public
interest. Thus, despite the efforts of the United States
in the international copyright field, some countries in
Europe and in Latin America claim that the copyright system
in the U.S. does not protect in an appropriate way the
personal rights of the authors or Moral Rights. The United
States is thus being forced by the civil law countries to
rethink its copyright laws in order to protect the
creator's noneconomic rights: the moral rights. 16
This critique and misunderstanding regarding the
protection of the Moral Rights in the U.S. is produced by a
wrong interpretation of the differences between the
American copyright system and the continental 11 author's
14Margret Moller, Author's Right or Copyright? at 11 (Gotzen ed. , 1st
ed. 1989)
.
15Pitta, supra note 2, at 3-4.
16Pitta, supra note 2, at 4
.
17The Continental Law System or Civil Law Countries' legal system is
the legal framework derived from both the Code Napoleon (promulgated
in 1804) and the system of jurisprudence held and administered in the
Roman Empire, particularly as set forth in the compilation of
Justinian and his succesors
. This Legal System has been assimilated
by most of the European and Latin American countries
.
5rights system. Therefore, in the case of Moral Rights, the
named international harmonization of legal rules seems to
be more difficult since there are philosophical and
constitutional differences between American copyright law
and the continental author's rights system. Here, the best
way to contribute to the strength of the harmonization
process is to understand and to consider the differences
that make the American copyright law a unique copyright
system among the other Berne Convention's countries.
Indeed, the U.S. copyright system is unique because
power to enact copyright statutes is derived from Article
I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution 18 ;
and, as the U.S. Congress has found, "copyright is granted
in order to stimulate artistic creation and innovation for
the ultimate benefit of society, and that the grant of
copyright must always be designed to safeguard the public
interest in the free exchange of information." 19 On the
other hand, "quite the opposite, the purest model of moral
rights, the Berne Convention, protects the author first and
foremost, without regard for the balance of society." 20
18U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl . 8 states that Congress shall have the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
19Legislative Report on the Copyright Act of 1909, H.R.Rep. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess . (1909) cited by Janine V. McNally, Congressional
Limits on Technological Alterations to Film: The Public Interest and
the Artists' Moral Right, 5 High Tech. L. J. 129, at 142 (1990) .
20Brett Sirota, The Visual Artists Act: Federal Versus States Moral
Rights, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 461, at 468 (1992) .
6Consequently, this paper will emphasize that the U.S.
copyright system has made an effort for the past 206
years 21 to accomplish a balance between the authors'
property rights and the people ' s right to learn to the
benefit of society. Yet, this effort has been threatened
by section 106A of the Copyright Act 22 in order to extend
the scope of the moral rights protection. 23 An
understanding of the real objectives of the American
constitutional copyright provision24 , and the particular
characteristics of the U.S. copyright system will enable
Congress to avoid, in the moral rights field, future
amendments to the American copyright law that may be
unconstitutional. For instance, the idea-expression
dichotomy doctrine 25 , which has been advanced as a means of
balancing competing interests of the First Amendment 26 and
21Two hundred and six years has been passed since the enactment of the
first copyright act of the United States on May 31, 1790. Copyright
Act of 1790 1 Stat. 124; 1st. Cong., 2d Sess
.
, c. 15 (1790).
22Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803, at 106A (1976)
.
23This attempt has been helped by the argument of the Berne's Civil Law
Countries that the authors moral rights do not receive protection in
the U.S.
24Copyright Clause, supra note 12.
25The idea-expression dichotomy principle was originated by the Supreme
Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (statuette lamp
bases held to be copyrightable, but the idea of a statuette used as
lamp based cannot be given copyright protection) ; see also Zacchini v.
Scripps -Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577-578 & n.13 (1977)
(the law places no restrain on the use of an idea or concept) ; Baker
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1880) (no copyright protection extended
to particular bookkeeping system)
.
26U.S. Const, amend. I.
7copyright, will be in danger because of the moral rights
doctrine . 27
Accordingly, this paper analyzes whether the inclusion
of the moral right doctrine, as known in the continental
law countries, in the U.S. statutory copyright system is
unconstitutional. To start with the analysis of the
problem, this paper discusses the moral rights concept in
both the Continental author's rights and the American
copyright laws; the differences between both systems; the
inapplicability of the natural law concept in the U.S.
copyright system; and the American constitutional
requirement of balance between the author's property right
and the people's right to learn. In order to proceed with
this analysis, it considers the First Amendment and the
fair use doctrine as essential elements in the American
copyright laws which have not been contemplated neither by
the Berne Convention nor by the Continental Law System.
This paper concludes that the Moral rights concept, as
understood in the Civil Law Countries, may be
unconstitutional in the U.S. copyright system.
21See generally Stephen S. Zimmermann, A Regulatory Theory of
Copyright: Avoiding a First Amendment Conflict, 35 Emory L. J. 163
(1986) .
Chapter II
The Moral Rights Doctrine in the Continental Law System and
the United States Copyright Legal System
I.- Copyright System V. Droit d' Auteur System
First of all, it is important for the constitutional
analysis of the U.S. copyright law to discuss the
differences between the copyright system (common law) and
the Author's rights system (continental law or civil law
countries)
.
Those of us who come from France, Italy, Latin America
or Germany have for many years used the term 'copyright'
when translating the notion 'droit d' auteur
'
, ' diritto di
autore', ' derecho de autor' or ' Urheberrecht ' into the
English Language. Even though the proper translation
should have been 'author's rights', for all of us
'copyright' is the term to use. As can be seen in the
following excerpt from Moller, "[a]nd as language has a
very seducing power, the fact that copyright is a different
system when compared with what is called 'author's rights'
was concealed. For many years, there was an all in all
functioning coexistence of national laws based on the
9author's right system or the copyright system within
Europe, [Latin America], and even throughout the world." 28
The national treatment concept, as well as the minimun
rights concept of the Berne Convention, provided for a
sufficient degree of international protection so that the
differences between national laws and thus between the
author's rights approach and the copyright approach did for
many years hardly show up. 29 However, the differences
between both systems are of special importance in the case
of Moral Rights.
As a result of the invention of the printing press by
Gutenberg in 1436, "booksellers could copy authors'
manuscripts at a much faster rate. Profits from the sales
of books helped the booksellers recover the cost of both
the authors' manuscripts and the printing press. The
invention of the printing press also enabled 'pirate'
booksellers to copy books already published by 'legitimate
booksellers'. These pirate booksellers were able to sell
these copied books at lower prices since they could avoid
paying for the authors' manuscripts. Neither the authors
who had sold their manuscripts nor the legitimate
booksellers had any legal recourse against these pirate
booksellers, and it became increasingly clear that some
28M611er, supra note 10, at 11
29M611er, supra note 10, at 11
10
protection was necessary." 30 Therefore, indeed, "the
pressure for protection came not from authors but from
booksellers, whose pecuniary interest was most threatened
by the pirate booksellers" 31 ; consequently, "publishers
created copyright as a private -law concept designed to
benefit themselves, not authors." 32 However, the
governments soon became aware of the copyright ' s power as a
device of censorship. 33 Thus, when the protection of works
became a medium not only to protect the economic interests
of authors but a medium to guarantee both the publishers
profits and governments control over the press, two
differents schools of thought emerged. 34
One school, natural law, was assimilated into the
civil law countries and promoted especially by France and
Germany. This theory (the natural rights approach adopted
30Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in
the Future, 3 J.L. & Tech. 1, at 3-4 (1988)
.
31 Id. , at 4
32L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 4 Vand. L.
Rev. 1, at 20 (1987)
.
33 See id. , at 24-25
34,, When the focus of copyright switched from the bookseller to the
author, a philosophical debate emerged as to the origin of the
right ... [s] ince the booksellers were not creators of a work, their
only interest was pecuniary. Authors, on the other hand, created the
books; the ideas belonged to them and emanated from them. Thus, many
philosophers argued that copyright should protect both the authors
'
economic and personal interests, and that those interests should be as
unlimited as possible. These philosophers pointed to natural law as
the basis of authors' rights... The natural rights approach, however,
was partially rejected in Great Britain and the United States."
Burger, supra note 30, at 5 (emphasis supplied)
.
11
in the continental law system) sustains that the "authors
always retained their personal or moral rights even if they
sold their economic rights to publishers .
"
3B The Author's
Rights or Droit d' Auteur system also sustains that the
inviolability of an author's personality is the ultimate
principle. On the other hand, the ultimate principle of
American copyright law is "to promote the Progress of
Science" 36 or, in other words, to secure the progress of
the society.
The influence of the natural law concept upon the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man has been widely
acknowledged. 37 Furthermore, "subsequent national and
international charters and declarations have continued to
ground their existence in natural law and natural rights
concepts. Among these, one may find the Berne Convention
and its doctrine of moral rights of authors." 38 The Berne
Agreement, for example, has recived formal recognition as
one part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 39
3 5Burger, supra note 30, at 6
.
36U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl . 8. See supra note 18.
37Robert C. Hauhart, Natural Law Basis for the Copyright Doctrine of
Droit Moral, 30 The Catholic Lawyer 53, at 62 (1985) .
3S Id.
39Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly of the United
Nations (1948). Article 27 reads: " (1) Everyone has the right freely
to participate in the culture of the community, to enjoy the arts and
to share in the scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic
production of which he is the author." Cited by Hauhart, supra note
37, at 62.
12
The continental law system based on natural law
concepts, is "less likely to find authors' rights
outweighed by the public's interest in easy access to
literary and artistic works." 40 Moreover, a natural rights
approach is logically more consistent not only with
international copyright protection41 but also with the
interest of publishers. 42
The other School, the Anglo-American copyright law,
was assimilated into the common law countries. The
author's copyright was merely conceived as an intangible
right granted by statute to the author, with the sole and
exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of his creation
and publishing and selling it. 43 Even though both American
and English copyright laws have the same roots, American
copyright law is more than a mere device for the protection
of authors rights. American copyright law is a
40Burger, supra note 30, at 7
41
"Natural rights, by their nature, are not bound by national borders;
they adhere to every living person. Thus, it follows that those
countries which based their copyright laws on natural rights
principles were the first countries to extend their laws not only to
their own citizens engaged in creating literary and artistic works,
but also to citizens of foreign countries engaged in similar creative
endeavors. This is not true in Anglo-American countries, where
copyright is considered a statutorily-created privilege for the
economic benefit of copyright owners. As such, Anglo-American
countries could limit copyright protection to domestic authors if they
felt it was economically prudent to do so, and such a decision would
certainly be consistent with their underlying copyright philosophy."
Burger, supra note 30, at 7.
42Burger, supra note 30, at 7.
43See Black's Law Dictionary 336 (6th ed. 1990).
13
constitutional command: "To promote the Progress..." 44 .
This command is precisely what the civil law countries and
the Berne Convention have forgotten and/or misunderstood.
Moreover, this command is precisely the idea that some
publishers are trying to weaken by supporting natural law
concepts like the moral rights doctrine. 45 Thus, in the
American copyright law, the economic protection provided to
the owner of the copyright is the means of the copyright
law not its goal. 46
In addition, the American copyright system found that
there are several rights involved in the copyright field:
"[t]he author's act of publication thus brings into play
the rights of others." 47 In consequence, the Framers of
the Constitution faced the fact that two different natural
law concepts came into conflict: that of the author's
natural property right, and the people's natural right to
learn; "[c]opyright thus is, and can be, only a positive-
44See Copyright Clause, supra note 18.
45
"There are two explanations for the continued claims as to the
author's natural -law right. One is that the theory is to the
advantage of publishers, whose ulterior motives are disguised by a
false implication that the theory is primarily to benefit the author.
The other is that writers generally treat the issue of the natural -law
basis for a right and the issue of the scope of that right as being
the same. The assumption seems to be that if the author's copyright
is a natural -law right, it provides the author with absolute dominion
over the work and exists in perpetuity." L. Ray Patterson, Copyright
and 'the Exclusive Right' of Authors, 1 J. Intell . Prop. L. 1, at 24
(1993) .
"Id.
* 7 Id.
, at 25.
14
law concept, because only a positive-law concept can serve
to mediate two natural -law rights. 1 ' 48 Therefore, as
Professor Patterson says, "the Copyright Clause makes the
point by recognizing the natural-law right of the people to
learn as well as the natural -law right of the author to
gain a profit. Thus, we come to the fundamental point.
American copyright, whatever its basis, cannot co-exist as
a natural-law right in a society where learning is a
natural-law right and the public domain has a natural -law
basis. " 49
In conclusion, it can be said that the American
copyright system is a statutory law where "the statutes did
not codify natural law; they replaced it and created in
authors an exclusive, but time-limited, right to prevent
others from copying their works without authorization." 50
The purpose of this exclusive right is to encourage the
production of science and useful arts51 as a means to
promote the progress52 and the welfare of the nation.
48Patterson, supra not 45, at 26
4S Id.
50Burger, supra note 30, at 6.
51Supra note 18
.
52 Id.
15
II.- Moral Rights Definition in the Continental Legal
System
Since the main purpose of this paper is to analyze
whether the moral rights doctrine is unconstitutional in
the context of the American copyright law, it is necessary
to discuss the elements that constitute this doctrine.
The moral rights doctrine has its origin in the
natural-law theories, the basis of the continental author's
rights system. Thus, besides economic rights, author's
rights also include moral rights. 53 These rights mainly
include the right to claim authorship and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of a work
which would be prejudicial to the author's honor or
reputation. 54 Moral rights is a civil law concept based on
the view that an artist's creation is an extension of his
personality. 55
53For instance, the French law of authors recognizes two kinds of
rights: a) Economic Rights: the right to exploit the work
commercially, and b) Personal Rights: moral rights or droit moral,
rights deriving from the work as an expression of the author's
personality. See Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27
Hastings L. J. 1023, 1025 (1976) .
54Article 6bis (1) of the Berne Convention states: "(1) Independently
of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation."
55See generally Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral
Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the United
States, 28 Bull. Copyright Soc'y. 1, 11-14 (1980).
>In examining the body of the continental copyright law
(author's rights system), the experts have isolated four
specific rights: 1.- The Right of Disclosure, 2.- The
Right of Attribution, 3.- The Right of Integrity (against
mutilation and distortion) , and 4 . - The Right of
Retraction.
"The right of disclosure recognizes that the author
generally is the sole judge of whether and when his work
may be brought to the knowledge of the public. The right
of attribution gives the author the right to have his work
attributed to him (or not, as the case where he wishes to
be anonymous or to employ a pseudonym) . The right of
integrity prohibits any change in a work without the
author's consent. And, the right of retraction permits the
author, after publication, to stop the further distribution
of his work or to make changes in it." 56 In addition,
pursuant to the Author's rights system, the moral rights
are perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible. 57
Within the Moral Rights Theory, two different schools
of thought can be distinguished. These postulates emerged
concerning the legal nature of artists' rights: one of
them espousing a monist theory of rights, and the other a
56Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for
the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 1 , at 7
(1988) .
57For example, the 1957 French Law declares that the droit moral is
perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible. C. civ. art. 543, Code
Penal arts. 425-429 (French Law of March 11, 1957 on literary and
artistic property) cited by Damich, supra note 52, at7.
17
dualist theory. 58 The monist theory, "influenced by the
writings of Kant, held that authors had a unitary set of
rights in their works that were fundamentally personal. 5
As personal rights, these rights were considered
inalienable, nonwaivable, and nonassignable. On the other
hand, the dualist theory60 , influenced by the writings of
Hegel, argued that authors had two distinct interests in
their works, one personal and the other economic. Each of
these interests was protected by a legally distinct set of
rights. " 61
In this point, it can be seen that neither the monist
nor the dualist theories take into consideration the
relation that exists between the protection of the author's
rights and the public's access to information and, thus,
knowledge
.
In accordance with the moral right theory, among the
four basic moral rights (disclosure, attribution,
58Dane S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real Obligations : A Property-law
Framework for the Protection of Authors' Moral Rights, 6 9 Tul . L. Rev.
935, at 939 (1995)
.
59This monist approach flourished in Germany. Id.
60
"The first French codification of Moral -Rights doctrine reflected the
triumph of the dualist theory. That law, enacted on March 11, 1957,
codified judge-made moral-rights doctrine to provide authors with an
'exclusive incorporeal property right in the work' that included
attributes 'of an intellectual and moral nature as well as attributes
of an economic nature'. The rights of an 'economic nature' included
rights similar to those possessed by the copyright holder under
copyright law. The rights of a 'moral nature' included authors' moral
rights (droit moral)." Id., at 939-940.
61Id.
18
integrity, and retraction) , only the right of retraction is
not perpetual. "Apparently, the thinking is that no one
but the artist is capable of knowing when to withdraw a
work; thus, the right terminates with the author's
death." 62 Nevertheless, since the authors are human
beings, the perpetual characteristic of the other moral
rights (disclosure, attribution, and integrity) seems to
exist in order to benefit the position of those who would
like to control the dissemination of information. 63
Moreover, since the authors are the owners of their ideas
under the continental moral rights doctrine, the perpetual
right of integrity may allow the control of political ideas
for an indefinite time. 64 For example, in a civil law
country, after the death of an author, who has no heirs,
the government will become trustee of the author's
property. Then, that government would possess the author's
62Christine L. Chinni , Droit D'Auteur Versus the Economics of
Copyright: Implications for American Law of Accession to the Berne
Convention, 14 New Eng. L. Rev. 145, 149 (1992) .
63 See, e. g., Swedish Law on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works,
Law No. 729, Dec. 30, 1960, art. 51 (Swed.) trans, as amended in 1991
in 27 Copyright (WIPO) , Swedish Text 1-01, at 8 (art. 51) (Sept. 1991)
(permitting government, after the author's death, to enjoin
performance or reproduction "in a manner which violates cultural
interests" ) .
64
"(T)he Netherlands decidedly does not belong to the group of
countries which recognize an eternal moral right, with the State
acting as a watchdog over the integrity of works, as well as with all
the ensuing dangers for freedom of expression and information."
Herman Cohen Jehoram, National Report on Moral Rights in the
Netherlands, in ALAI Congress. Cited by Adolf Dietz, ALAI Congress
:
Antwerp 1993 The Moral Right of Author: Moral Rights and the Civil
Law Countries, 19 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 199, at 215 (1995).
19
ideas, and the society may have no access to them. 6
Therefore, another counterweight to droit moral is to be
found in the necessity of guaranteeing public access to
others' ideas.
III.- Avoiding the Moral Rights Controversy in the
International Trade Field.
It is worth mentioning here that during the
negotiations of both the TRIPs and the NAFTA66 Agreements,
the United States succeeded in avoiding a dispute that
seemed to be irresolvable: the moral rights protection. 67
Under the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), " [m] embers shall
comply with articles 1-21 and the Appendix of the Berne
Convention. However, Members shall not have rights or
obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights
conferred under article 6bis [moral rights] 6B of that
65
"The case of the cancellation of a grant from the Danish Film
Institute for the production of a film on the life of Jesus Christ on
the ground that the film would be an infringement of the moral rights
of the authors of the Bible, a case which finally was decided on other
grounds, has demonstrated the danger of [the moral rights doctrine] ."
Id. , at 214.
66North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 December 1992, Canada-Mexico-
United States, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. See also: North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1993, c. 44;
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) .
67See generally Jorg Reinbothe & Anthony Howard, The State of Play in
the Negotiations on TRIPs (GATT/'Uruguay Round), 5 EIPR 157 (1991).
68See supra note 50.
20
Convention or of the rights derived therefrom." 69
Moreover, article 9 (2) of TRIPs also considered the
American idea-expression-dichotomy principle stating that
" [c] opyright protection shall extend to expressions and not
to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical
concepts as such." 70 This provision serves the
dissemination of ideas and technology throughout the world,
and principally benefit developing countries.
In the same way, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), in its part 6, chapter 17, annex 1701.3
(2) states that " [n] otwithstanding article 1701 (2) (b) 71 ,
this Agreement confers no rights and imposes no obligations
on the United States with respect to article 6bis [moral
rights] of the Berne Convention, or the rights derived from
that article. " 72
In conclusion, the moral rights controversy arises
only with regard to the Berne Convention. Therefore, it is
necessary to discuss the moral rights doctrine under the
Berne Convention.
69Supra note 8, art. 9 (1) .
'70 Id. , art. 9 (2) .
71Article 1701 (2) (b) of the NAFTA Agreement states: "[t]o provide
adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights, each Party shall, at a minimum, give effect to this
Chapter and to the substantive provisions of: (b) the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1971
(Berne Convention). See supra note 62.
72 Id.
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IV.- Moral Rights definition in the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
The Berne Convention 73 is an international treaty that
provides a means for reciprocal copyright protection and a
framework of minimun standards of rights in each of the
countries signing it. "The Berne Convention, in addition
to national treatment principles, requires that certain
well -specif ied minimum rights be guaranteed under the
domestic laws of each member." 74 Thus, the Berne
Convention supplies the highest form of international
copyright protection available in the international area.
The purpose of this treaty is found in its article 1
which stated that the Union was formed for the protection
of the rights of authors. It is clear that this focus was
indicative of the droit d'auteur countries' (continental-
natural-law system) influence in drafting the Convention. 75
A.- The Approach to the Harmonization
The intention of the Berne Convention was "to
establish certain minimum standards which all contracting
countries were required to recognize and later to expand
73 Supra note 5
74Carlos J. Moorhead, The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987,
3 J.L.& Tech. 187, 188 (1988).
75Burger, supra note 30, at 16.
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these minimum requirements to achieve the ultimate
objective of a uniform international law of copyright.
Individual countries could give foreign authors greater
protection than required by the Convention, but in no case
could they give less protection." 76 In addition, "the
fundamental principle of the Berne Convention was, and
continues to be, national treatment. Under the national
treatment concept, Berne signatories grant authors who are
nationals of other Berne countries the same protection they
accord to their own nationals. National treatment is
significant because it ensures nondiscriminatory treatment
for authors in all contracting states." 77
Because of the philosophical elements that are
involved in the moral rights doctrine, "there is no
unanimity even within the group of civil law countries as
to how far moral rights protection extends and what
individual faculties it should cover. However, unanimity
exists, at least in principle, as far as the paternity
right and the integrity right are concerned." 78 For that
reason, the Berne Convention requires, as a minimum
standard, the protection of the paternity and the integrity
moral rights. 79 Nevertheless, since civil law countries
have higher standards in the field of moral rights than the
76Burger, supra note 30, at 16.
77 Id. , at 16-17.
78Dietz, supra note 60, at 219.
79See article 6bis of the Berne Convention, supra note 50
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United States, they feel that their authors are not
receiving the same fair treatment. Moreover, the
continental law countries feel that their authors' works
are exposed to the American fair use doctrine80 ; and,
therefore, their works can be used, in the United States,
without the payment of the royalties due them. This fear
is produced by the misunderstanding of the fair use
doctrine in the Continental Law. For this reason, the
publishing companies from the civil law countries would
like to see the scope of the moral rights extended in the
United States and the concept of moral rights, as it is
understood in the continental system, incorporated into the
legal system of the United States. In this way they may be
able to prevent the application of the fair use doctrine.
It seems to be that the international harmonization of
the moral rights rules is complete since there is a minimum
standard regarding the paternity and the integrity rights.
However, there are two problems at this point: First, the
civil law countries insist that the United States does not
fulfill the Berne Convention's moral rights standards; and
80The fair use doctrine is "a privilege in others than the owner of a
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without the owner's consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to
the owner." Black's Law Dictionary 598 (6th ed. 1990) . The fair use
doctrine has statutory recognition in section 107 of the Copyright Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C §§ 101-803, at § 107 (1976). Section 107 states:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use) , scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of coptright .
"
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second, there is a conflict between the moral rights, at
least in reference to the integrity right, and both the
principles on which the copyright system is based and the
First Amendment
.
81
B.- Moral Rights in the Berne Convention
The original Berne Convention was signed on September
9, 1886 in Berne, Switzerland. 82 During the Rome Revision
Conference of 1928 a new set of rights was created: the
droit moral or moral rights. That was the first time that
the Berne Convention recognized the personal element which
already existed in most continental European countries. 83
In the international field, the most commonly known
expression of the protection of moral rights of authors is
the formula adopted by the Berne Convention at the Revision
Conference of Rome. Thus, article 6bis of the Treaty
covers two specific rights, namely the right to claim
authorship of the work or paternity right and the right of
81For the analysis of this point, see Chapter IV of this paper.
82Since its original signing, the Convention has been revised five
times and amended twice. The subsequent revisions and amendment are
as follows: Additional Act and Declaration of Paris, done on May 4,
1896; Act of Berlin Revision done on November 13, 1908; Additional
Protocol of Berne, done on March 20, 1914; Rome Revision, done on June
2, 1928; Brussels Revision, done on June 26, 1948; Stockholm Revision,
done on July 14, 1967; and Paris Revision of 1971. See Burger, supra
note 30.
83 Id. , at 28.
integrity. 84 However, this provision is a minimalist
approach if we compare this with the protection available
in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and other European and
Latin American countries. 85
C- Does the United States fulfill the Berne Convention's
Moral Rights Standards?
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall
have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification
of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation. 86
This article recognizes two differents rights: the
integrity right 87 and the attribution right 88 . These rights
84See supra note 50.
85Dietz, supra note 60, at 200.
86Berne Convention, art. 6bis, supra note 5.
87
"The semi-official guide published by the Berne Convention's
secretariat comments that this [integrity right] is very elastic and
leaves a good deal of latitude to the courts." World Intellectual
Property Organization, Guide to the Berne Convention, 42 (1978) cited
by Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8D.01[B]
(Vol. 2 1996)
.
88
"The [semi-official] guide [published by the Berne Convention's
secretariat] elaborates three branches of the Berne 'paternity' right,
i.e., to assert that the author is the work's creator; to publish
anonymously or pseudonymous ly, with the option of later changing his
26
constitute a part of the author's rights definition of the
moral rights. Thus, the language of this article
establishes the Berne minimum. 89
The United States officially became a member of the
Berne Convention on March 1, 198 9. The adherence of the
U.S. was the product of two acts: the Senate ratification
of the Convention (on Oct. 31, 1988) 90 ; and the signing by
President Reagan of the Berne Convention Implementation Act
of 1988. 91 After the adherence of the U.S. to the Berne
Convention, further incentive for the recognition of moral
rights arose since article 6bis of the Convention required
the recognition of those rights. 92 However, the Berne
Convention Implementation Act did not provide for federal
moral rights protection. The United States provided a
convenient rationale for this position by concluding that
"[there is] substantial protection. .. for the real
equivalent of moral rights under statutory and common law
in the U.S." 93 Moreover, the legislation by which the
mind and abandoning anonymity; and to prevent use of his name with
reference to a work that he did not create." Id.
89 Id.
90See generally Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and
Two Years Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 Colum.-VLA J.
L. & Arts 1 (1988) .
91Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, supra note 6.
92Damich, supra note 52, at 3.
93Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the
Berne Convention, 10 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 1 (513), 35 (547) (1986)
cited by Id.
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United States acceded to the Berne Convention specifically
states that the Treaty itself is not self -executing 94 ,
meaning that the terms of the Convention do not require new
legislation implementing specific provisions of the
Convention.
The issue of moral rights was debated vigorously
before the accesion to the Berne Convention. The final
position was that U.S. could qualify for Berne moral rights
standards on the basis of existing common law rules, and
that "the obligations of the U.S. under the Berne
Convention may be performed only pursuant to appropriate
domestic law. " 95
Because of the philosophical differences between the
American copyright law and the Author's rights system which
supports the moral rights doctrine, the U.S. consistently
has refused to recognize moral rights, as such, but through
various common law doctrines, such as defamation,
misrepresentation, the right of privacy, the right of
publicity, unfair competition, and federal claims such as
section 43 (a) of the Lanham act 96 , courts frequently have
upheld claims of moral right. 97 Therefore, it can be said
94Supra note 6, § 2 (1)
95Supra note 6, § 2 (2)
96Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051 et seq.
97See generally Damich, supra note 56; and Sophia Davis, State Moral
Rights Law and The Federal Copyright System, 4 Cardozo Arts & Ent . L.
J. 233 (1985)
.
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that the U.S. does fulfill the minimum standard of moral
rights' protection which the Berne Convention requires.
However, despite the fact that the U.S. considers itself
qualified for Berne's moral rights standards (on the basis
of existing state and federal remedies) , "moral rights
advocates have continued to push for federal laws which
provide more thorough compliance with the Berne
Convention. ,l98
1.- The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) 99
Despite their inability to obtain further federal
moral rights provision, supporters of artists' moral rights
had some success in the U.S. since the Congress passed the
Visual Artists Rights Act in 1990 (VARA) . The creation of
VARA was made easier by the United States' accession to the
Berne Convention. 100 However, the scope of the VARA is
limited because it only applies to visual artists' moral
rights 101
,
and only to certain kind of works. 102 Therefore,
98Sirota, supra note 20, at 465.
"Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113,
301, 411, 412, 501, 506 (Supp. Ill 1992) [hereinafter VARA]
.
100Sirota, supra note 20, at 464.
10117 U.S.C. § 106A, see supra note 99.
102
"Artists were given both integrity and attribution rights under
[VARA] but with several limitations. The statute applied only to
'original paintings and drawings ... sculpture, prints and noncommercial
photographs'. Also the works must be originals. Copies are only
allowed 'in signed, consecutively numbered, limited editions of no
more than 200 copies.
' The rights are not perpetual and do not last
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as it is suggested by Professor Damich, the Visual Artists
Rights Act does not fully meet article 6bis of the Berne
Convention 103 ; and, for this reason, the supporters of the
moral rights doctrine insist on the expansion of the Visual
Artists Rights Act's scope. 104 Contrary to the position of
those who support VARA, there are commentators who "lament
the passage of VARA as erroneous on grounds such as private
property and First Amendment free speech rights." 105
The Committee for America's Copyright Community (CACC)
suggests "that the reason for the concerns of Congress and
the limitations provided in VARA is regard for the
objective of the U.S. Constitution's copyright clause,
ensuring public availability of a broad array of
intellectual and artistic works." 106 Moreover, the Congress
as long as copyright protection. Rather, they last only as long as
the artist lives. In addition, all works made 'for hire' are
excluded." Karen Y. Crabbs , The Future of Authors' and Artists' Moral
Rights in America, 26 Beverly Hills B.A.J. 167, 172 (1992) .
103
"Professor Damich has also written on the subject of the United
States adherence to the Berne Convention with respect to article 6bis
.
Furthermore, he testified at the subcommittee's hearings regarding
United States adherence to the Berne Convention . See Edward J.
Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 Colum.VLA
J.L. & Arts 655 (1986) cited by Dana L. Burton, Artists' Moral
Rights: Controversy and the Visual Artists Rights Act, 48 SMU L. Rev.
639, 664 (1995) .
104
"Commentators who support moral rights protection for artists are
generally in favor of expansion of these rights beyond the narrow
confines of VARA." Id., at 655.
10S Id.
106 Id. at 656.
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made clear in the enactment of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act and the Visual Artists Rights Act that
its intention was not to extend the moral rights
protection. 107 Thus, the Congress concluded that the moral
rights could be protected by common law doctrines. 108
In fact, besides the common law doctrines (i.e.,
defamation, unfair competition,, privacy right, and
publicity right) and federal statutes (i.e., § 43 (a) of
the Lanham Act) which are used to protect the moral rights
in the U.S., there are nine states that have enacted laws
protecting the rights of integrity and attribution for
visual artists. 109 Thus, these laws were cited by Congress
as part of the reason why the United States already
complied with article 6bis of the Berne Convention. 110
Therefore, it is obvious that the Congress enacted the
Visual Artists Rights Act in order to please the authors'
and publishers' groups who support moral rights legislation
in U.S.; in doing so, it seems that Congress made no
further considerations of VARA's effects on the First
Amendment
.
107Burton, supra note 103, at 656.
108See supra note 93
.
109Nine States have moral rights laws: California, Connecticut,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Rhode Island. See Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.02[A] .
110See S. Rep. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess . 9-10 (1988).
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The Visual Artists Rights Act grants to the artists
both the right of attribution and the right of integrity;
however, VARA does not define what third-party's conduct
could violate the provisions in the statute. 111 Thus, as
Kathryn A. Kelly said:
" [The Visual Artists Rights Act] merely grants the
artist the rights, with no affirmative language
prohibiting the owner or beholder from conduct that
would constitute a violation of the artist ' s rights.
While moral rights are indeed intangible property
rights, a vague prohibition against prejudicing an
artist's honor or reputation leaves an owner or
beholder without guidance as to what constitutes such
prejudice. The First Amendment is implicated here
because an owner or beholder may be prohibited from
engaging in protected First Amendment speech. The Act
could chill speakers from engaging in expressive
speech or acts that might prejudice an artist's
repu ta ti on . " 112
li:LKathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting
Honor Before Free Speech?, 11 U. Miami Ent . & Sports L. Rev. 211
(1994) .
112Kelly, supra note 111.
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V.- Moral Rights Definition in the United States Copyright
System
Many have said that the moral rights are not
appropriately protected in the United States.
Nevertheless, in order to answer whether the moral rights
are actually protected in the U.S. legal system, we have to
determine whether or not there is such a concept as moral
rights in the American copyright system.
In the Continental legal system, the rights of an
author can be summarized as falling into two categories:
the economic rights and the right of personality or moral
rights. However, the precise meaning of the author's moral
rights could be different from one nation to another
according to the legal system adopted for each legislation.
Moreover, the author's moral rights is not a concept that
can define a single right, yet it is a notion that includes
a collection of rights which protect the personality of the
author as he has expressed it in his work. 113
In the United States copyright system, the Copyright
Act of 1976 recognizes the economic rights in section
106. 114 In addition, the Copyright Act also recognizes some
authors' personal rights in section 106A. 115 However, there
113Hauhart, supra note 37, at 56.
114 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
115 Id.
, § 106A. Also see supra notes 99 and 102.
33
are neither a statutory nor a common law set of rights
named as moral rights. Indeed, " [t]he adjective 'moral'
has no precise English equivalent, although 'spiritual',
non-economic' and 'personal' convey something of the
intended meaning." 116 Thus, in the U.S. legal system , "the
phrase 'personal rights' more accurately translates the
concept of droit moral than does 'moral rights', and it is
more suggestive of the theoretical basis that underlies the
concept." 117 Accordingly, we can use in the U.S. copyright
system the phrase personal rights instead of moral rights.
The idea that connects American right of personality
and the concept of moral rights in the Continental legal
system is that the works are expressions of the creative
personality of the authors, and insofar as these works
represent the authors' personalities, the works should be
protected. 118 Thus, courts in the United States have
protected the authors' personality interests in their
works. 119 This protection has become available through the
creative use of states common law, and the Federal Unfair
Competition Law (Lanham Act) . 120 Therefore, the only way,
116Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.01[A].
117Damich, supra note 56, at 6.
118Damich, supra note 56, at 4
.
119See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14
(2nd Cir. 1976) . WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video,
Inc., 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982). Follet v. Arbor House Publishing
Co., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
120Davis, supra note 97, at 234.
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not only to fulfill the Berne Convention standards (in the
moral rights issue) but also to actually protect the
personal rights of authors in the U.S. copyright system, is
through the common law doctrines and federal statutes that
already protect the authors' personal interests in their
works
.
A.- Conflict Among Different Kinds of Rights
Courts have seen the need to protect the link that
exists between the artist and his work by recognizing the
personal rights of authors (moral rights) through the use
of states common law actions (i.e., defamation, invasion of
privacy, and breach of contract) and section 43 (a) of the
Lanham Act (federal unfair competition) . However, the
conflict remains regarding the other rights involved in the
copyright field, which must be balanced. Thus, it is also
important to balance the three policies embraced in the
Copyright Clause.
Besides the personal rights of authors, there are two
more rights that must be considered after the publication
of the work: First, the author's economic rights; and
second, the people's right to learn. Furthermore, the
three policies that we can recognize in the Copyright
Clause 121 are: First, the promotion of learning; second,
12
^.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl . 8. See supra note 18.
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the protection of the public domain; and third, the
protection for limited times of the author's rights. 122
1.- The necessity of balance: Natural Law v. Positive
Law, and the personal rights
As it was said before, the only method available to
balance two different natural laws in conflict, without
placing one above the other, is through the creation of a
positive-law doctrine. 123 In the case of the American
copyright system, the Constitution is the foundation in
which the positive-copyright-law doctrine is based.
However, the Copyright Clause was not enough to ensure the
complete balance required by the important rights involved.
Therefore, the ultimate goal of the copyright (to promote
the progress by promoting the public's access to the works
in order to disseminate knowledge) is clearly meaningless
if with this freedom of access to the knowledge does not
also come the freedom to express the ideas and the
knowledge which is guaranteed by the First Amendment. 124 In
122Patterson, supra note 45, at 24
123See supra notes 45-49.
124
"The First Amendment's free speech protections prohibit the
inhibition of the free flow of information. The Copyright Clause
provides a limited yet exclusive statutory monopoly to authors for
their works for the explicit purpose of promoting science and useful
arts. Thus, a copyright may conflict with the Constitution's
protections of free speech when copyright is used to inhibit the free
flow of information." Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 164.
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this way, both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment
ensure not only the balance among the different rights
involved in the dissemination of knowledge but also
guarantee the final goal of the American copyright
system. 125 Therefore, if the Continental -moral -rights
doctrine is used to protect the personal interests of the
authors without taking into consideration the balance
required by the American Constitution, the moral right
doctrine in the United States may be unconstitutional.
In the same way, when protecting the personal rights
of authors, the courts' analysis of the common law and the
federal unfair competition actions must be done in
accordance with this need of balance and the alliance that
exists between the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment. Otherwise, the courts' analysis may also be
unconstitutional
.
In conclusion, it can be said that the protection of
the authors' personal rights or right of personality in
America must be considered in conjunction with the balance
between the different rights and the three-constitutional
-
copyright policies required by the constitutional command.
125The fundamental purpose of the American Copyright is to promote the
progress by promoting the public's access to the works in order to
disseminate knowledge. Thus, the copyright's goal, in short, is to
promote learning.
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B.- The Natural Law Concept and its Inapplicability in the
United States Copyright System
The Continental -moral -right doctrine is based on
natural law principles. Thus, the moral rights doctrine or
droit moral "has its philosophical roots buried deeply in
natural law theories that permeate both the later English
and American common law and the natural rights movements of
the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries." 126
Moreover, since moral rights are based in natural law, the
authors' moral rights are perpetual, inalienable, and
imprescriptible. These characteristics of the authors'
moral rights are incompatible with the American statutory
copyright law because the American copyright system has to
deal with the balance of interests required by the
Constitution. 127
Even though American common law recognized that the
common law copyright is based on natural law principles,
the American copyright system has subordinated common law
copyright to statutory copyright 128 in order to provide an
adequate balance of interests in the benefit of the
Copyright Clause's goal: the promotion of progress. 129
126Hauhart, supra note 37, at 69.
127For the analysis of the balance of interests required by the
Constitution, see Chapter II, Section V (A) (1) of this paper.
128Hauhart, supra note 37, at 67.
129See Copyright Clause, supra note 18.
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The first American case that discussed the natural law
basis for the copyright system was Wheaton v. Peters 130 .
However, it is important to mention here that the
background of the Wheaton v. Peters case can be found in
two English cases: Millar v. Taylor, 131 and Donaldson v.
Beckett132 .
Millar, a 1769 King's Bench decision, was the earliest
English case that discussed the natural law basis of the
copyright common law. Millar held that an author had a
common- law copyright in perpetuity despite the Statute of
Anne. 133 Thus, in Millar, "[by] accepting the claim of the
booksellers, the King's Bench ignored the intentions of the
Statute of Anne 134 to exclude an author's property right." 135
The objective of the Statute of Anne was to destroy
censorship and to promote public access to the authors'
works. Thus, pursuant to the Statute of Anne, the
copyright holder was given a right to control the
reproduction of the author's work in exchange for the duty
of returning the work to the public domain after fourteen
13033 U.S. (8 Peters) 374 (1834).
1314 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B. 1769)
.
1324 Burr. 2407, 98 Eng. Rep. 257; 17 Cobbett s Pari. Hist. Eng. 953
(H.L. 1774) .
133Patterson, supra note 32, at 15.
134Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710) (this is the first English
copyright statute)
.
135Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 177
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years. 136 After the decision in Millar, this case was
accepted as substantiating the existence of a common law
copyright based on natural law principles. However, five
years later, Millar was overruled by Donaldson v. Beckett.
In 1774, the House of Lords in Donaldson v. Beckett
"held that an author had a common- law copyright in his
works, but only until publication, after which he must look
to the Statute [of Anne] for protection." 137 Therefore, the
decision in Donaldson concluded that common law copyright
(based on natural law principles) had been supplanted by
statutory copyright after the publication of the works.
Thus, the authors' natural rights embodied in the common
law copyright exist in perpetuity, but those authors'
natural rights cease to exist as soon as the author's work
is published. This legal fiction occurs because the
authors' act of publication brings into play the people's
right to learn. 138
136
"The intent of the Statute of Anne to destroy censorship and
encourage public access is best seen in the language of the statute's
title: 'An Act for the Encouragment of Learning, by vesting the
copies of printed books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such copies,
during the Times therein mentioned'." Moreover, "[t]he Statute of
Anne in Section V not only indicates the regulatory nature of the law
but also the overriding importance given to providing sufficient
public access. This chapter provides penalties for those stationers
who do not provide copies of the book for the various public and
university libraries. Section IV included an added precaution of
extensive price control for the books published." Zimmermann, supra
note 27, at footnotes 66-67.
137Patterson, supra note 32, at 15.
138See Patterson, supra note 45, at 25.
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The American Constitutional Convention adopted the
Copyright Clause in 1789. 139 Because of the influence of
the English copyright system, the language of the Copyright
Clause was drawn from the introduction of the Statute of
Anne140 , and the First United States Copyright Act 141 sought
to preserve the regulatory nature of the English copyright
system under the Statute of Anne. 142 Thus, the first
American copyright case, that discussed the natural law
basis for common law copyright, followed the English lead
in Donaldson v. Beckett. 142 That case was Wheaton v.
Peters
.
Wheaton v. Peters discussed the natural -property-right
of the authors which ends at publication by constitutional
command. Accordingly, the decision in Wheaton v. Peters
recognized that the new property right or copyright created
by the statute was not a recognition of the principle that
a man is entitled to the fruits of his labor, but was
instituted "to promote the progress of science and useful
139For a thorough description of the creation of the American Copyright
Clause and the first American copyright law, see Penning, The Origin
of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEORGETOWN
L. J. 109 (1929) cited by Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 178. Also see
Patterson, supra note 32, at 13-19 (discussing the Adoption of the
Copyright Clause)
.
i40See supra note 136.
141The First United States Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124; 1st Cong., 2d
Sess. , c. 15 (1790) .
142See Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 178-17 9.
143Hauhart, supra note 37, at 67.
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arts" 144 . Thus, the decision in Wheaton v. Peters 145
illustrates the main difference between the American
copyright system and the Continental author's rights
system.
In conclusion, American common law copyright
recognizes the natural-law-rights of the authors which
could sustain the moral rights doctrine as it is understood
in the Continental author's rights system. Nevertheless,
the Copyright Clause of the Constitution does not provide
either for the continuation of the common- law copyright or
the continuation of the authors' natural rights embodied in
the common- law copyright; however, the Copyright Clause
created a new statutory right by its own constitutional
authority. 146 Therefore, the natural law theory is
certainly contrary to the American Copyright Clause and
contrary to the United States Supreme Court decision in
Wheaton v. Peters. Indeed, the natural law theory is
inapplicable in the United States copyright system.
144See U.S. Copyright Clause, supra note 18.
145
"This case dealt with the controversy arising between two Supreme
Court reporters, Peters and Wheaton. Peters published his Condensed
Reports which had reported cases in the first volume of Wheaton '
s
reports. The case presented a question very similar to the one
resolved by the House of Lords in Donaldson. The majority opinion
made it clear that an author has a proprietary right in his work from
the time of its inception, but that the author loses this common law
monopoly when he takes advantage of statutory copyright and publishes.
Once there is publication, protection for the work is found only under
the federal copyright statute." Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 179-
180.
146See Patterson, supra note 45, at 26
4:
C- The System of Dual Protection: Common Law and
Statutory Copyright Law
After the above analysis of both the Copyright Clause
and the decision of the Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters,
it can be sustained that the American-common- law copyright
does recognize the authors' natural rights based on natural
law principles, but these rights end at publication.
Therefore, an author is entitled to the protection
available through the common- law copyright (until the
publication of his work) and the protection available
through the statutory copyright law. This system of dual
protection produced two separate concepts of copyright
:
the common-law copyright and the statutory copyright.
In the case of the moral rights doctrine, the
distinction between common law and statutory protection
made it difficult to predict exactly when common- law
privileges would be extinguished and when statutory
protection would begin. This difficulty arises because the
moral rights, pursuant to the author's rights system, are
perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible; and, thus,
they have no possible statutory limits. For this reason,
the moral rights doctrine cannot be applied in the context
of the American copyright system. On the contrary, in the
context of the American copyright system, we should discuss
personal rights protection instead of moral rights. Thus,
if a work represents its author's personality, the work
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should be protected, but this protection must be limited
(after publication) by the Copyright Clause principles.
The system of dual protection also explains why the
author's right of personality might be protected by other
common-law actions in the United States. Since the common-
law torts of defamation, the common- law right of privacy,
the common-law right of publicity, the common-law unfair
competition, and misappropiation are not preempted by the
Copyright Act, these common- law doctrines could be used to
protect the author's personal rights in the work. However,
the courts' application of these common-law doctrines must
consider not only the Copyright Clause but also the First
Amendment implications. Only in this way will the authors'
right of personality be considered as another means to
balance the different rights interacting in the copyright
field.
Chapter III
The Protection of the Author's Right of Personali ty in the
United States Copyright System
Authors tend to have economic as well personal
interests in their creations. Hence, if a work is the
expression of the creative personality of its author, the
work should be protected provided that the aforesaid
protection be considered in connection with the Copyright
Clause's objective and the First Amendment's principles.
Therefore, it is important to state that we are not against
the protection of the authors' personal rights, but rather
that nobody should accept the violation of constitutional
policies, especially if those policies were thought to
benefit the society.
The need to protect the link that exists between the
artist and his work is not a new concept in American law. 147
In the past, courts have at times protected authors'
personality interests in their works. Such protection
could be sought by using some state common law theories
147
"The torts of violation of the right of privacy and defamation per
se are examples of causes of action that protect the plaintiff
'
s
interest in his 'honor', an aspect of the right of personality."
Hearings on S. 1198 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess . 33
(1989) (statement of Edward J. Damich, Professor of Law, on the VARA
Senate Hearings)
.
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(i.e., unfair competition, defamation, and invasion of
privacy) . 148
I.- Authors 1 Personal Rights that could be Protected in the
United States Copyright System
The Berne Convention only requires the protection of
the paternity right (attribution right) and the integrity
right as the minimun standard for moral rights
protection. 149 Moreover, article 6bis (3) of the Berne
Convention states that "[t]he means of redress for
safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be
governed by the legislation of the country where protection
is claimed." 150 Therefore, the United States does not have
to accept the Continental Moral Rights Doctrine, as it has
been claimed by the civil law countries, to comply with the
Berne minimun standard.
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, there are four
main rights embodied in the moral rights doctrine. They
are: the Right of Disclosure, the Right of Attribution,
the Right of Integrity (against mutilation and distortion)
,
and the Right of Retraction. Each of these rights could be
148See generally Davis, supra note 97.
149Berne Convention, supra note 5, art 6bis (1)
.
150 Id.
,
art. 6bis (3)
.
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protected not only by different common law actions but by
the federal unfair competition law 151 .
II.- Protection of Authors 1 Personal Rights in the United
States Copyright System
A.- The Right of Disclosure
The right of disclosure recognizes that the author has
the privilege of determining when to release his work. The
basis of this right is the idea that the author is the sole
judge of whether and when his work may be brought to the
knowledge of the public. 152 The right of disclosure has
been called the right of first publication, and it "is
nothing other than an American analog to France's droit de
divulgation." 153 In the American copyright law, Section 106
(3) of the Copyright Act of 1976 recognizes the right to
distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public.
This section of the Copyright Act "has been identified as
the statutory enactment of the common- law right of first
publication. Therefore, the right of disclosure could be
protected by the common law copyright until publication,
after which it will be protected by the statute.
151See Lanham Act, supra note 96.
152See Damich, supra note 56. Also see Michael C. Perm, Colorization
of Films: Painting a Moustache on the 'Mona Lisa'?, 58 Cin. L. Rev.
1023, at 1027-1028 (1990)
.
153Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.05 [A].
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The United States Supreme Court found that the right
of first public distribution has two aspects: the personal
aspect of creative control and the economic aspect of
publishing first. 154 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Harper
& Row Publishers v. Nation Enters. 155 "held that under
ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the
first public appearance of his undisseminated expression
will outweigh a claim of fair use." 156 In Harper & Row, the
Supreme Court upheld the natural law theory in order to
protect not only the personal interest in creative control
but also the economic interest in exploitation of
prepublication rights without taking into consideration the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment implications. The
problem in the Harper & Row decision is not the Court '
s
conclusion, but rather the wrong analysis that allowed the
Court to reach the conclusion. We should remember that,
when protecting the personal rights of authors, the courts'
analysis of both common law and statutary copyright law
must be done in accordance with the Copyright Clause and
the First Amendment principles.
154
"The author's control of first public distribution implicates not
only his personal interest in the creative control but his property
interest in exploitation of prepublication rights." Harper & Row
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985).
lss Id.
156Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.05[A].
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B.- The Right of Attribution
The right of attribution gives the author the right to
have his work attributed to him (or not, as the case where
he wishes to be anonymous or to employ a pseudonym) . 157
This right allows the author to present himself to the
public as the creator of a work, to require others to
acknowledge his authorship, and to prevent others from
attributing works to the author which he did not
originate. 158 This right is well-recognized within the
United States copyright system. 159
The right of attribution or paternity right could be
protected by the common-law right of privacy, the common-
law right of publicity, and section 43 (a) of the Lanham
Act. For example, section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act "may be
invoked whenever an author's composition is published
without being accompanied by his name." 160 Thus, if the
name of an author is substituted for another's name as the
author of a work, such a conduct would constitute a false
designation of origin or false representation within the
157Damich, supra note56, at 7.
158Penn, supra note 152, at 1028
159
"The volume of U.S. case law that [exists] under the rubrics of
attribution and integrity leaves no doubt that each of those rights is
anything but orphaned within the legal framework of the United
States." Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.02[D].
160 Id. , at § 8D.03 [A] [2] .
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meaning of section 43 (a) . The leading case here is Smith
v. Montoro . 161
An author's attribution right could also be violated
if he is designated as an author of a work in which he has
not contributed. 162 Thus, in Follett v. Arbor House
Publishing Co. 163 the court found that false attribution
also constitutes a false description or representation in
violation of Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act. 164
Other theories have been invoked in order to protect
the right of paternity. These theories are: defamation,
invasion of the right of privacy, and breach of contract.
There is defamation "when the work falsely attributed
to the author is of an inferior quality and consequently
damages his reputation." 165 There is an invasion of the
161648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) ("In this case, the plaintiff, an actor
who starred in a motion picture distributed by the defendant, claimed
a violation of his rights under Section 43 (a) by reason of
defendant ' s deletion of his name from the film credits and
accompanying advertising material, and its substitution of the name of
another actor in such credits and advertisements. In reversing the
district court's dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that reverse passing off, which consists of the unauthorized
removal or obliteration of the original trademark on goods produced by
another before the resale of such goods, constitutes a violation of
Section 43(a). The court thereupon found defendant's conduct to
constitute a false designation of origin, or false representation
within the meaning of Section 43 (a) . The court further concluded that
such false designation or representation occurs when the name of
another is substituted for the plaintiff's name as the star of a
motion picture") . Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.03[A] [2] .
162 Id. , at § 8D.03 [B] .
163497 F supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
164See Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.03[B] .
165 Id. Also see Clevenger v. Baker, Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187 (1960)
and Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250 (1929).
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right of privacy when the author's name is used in false
attribution. 166 There is a breach of contract if the
defendant is contractually obligated to give the author
'credit' in connection with his work, but the defendant
does not fulfill his obligation. 167
C- The Right of Integrity
The right of integrity prohibits any change
(distortion or modification) in a work without the author's
consent, provided that such distortion or modification
would constitute a misrepresentation of the author's
artistic expression. 168 The right of integrity, "like the
other moral rights, is held by the creator, and is
independent of any economic rights that he may or may not
have in the work." 169
The right of integrity could be protected by common-
law unfair competition and section 43 (a) of the Lanham
Act. 170 The leading case here is Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Companies (ABC). 111 The court in Gilliam held
166Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.03[B]. Also see Follett v. Arbor
House Publishing Co., supra note 163.
161 Id.
168Penn, supra note 152, at 1028.
169 Jd.
170Damich, supra note 56, at 61.
171 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). In Gilliam, the court ruled that
deleting 27% of the work grossly altered the work and constituted a
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"that unauthorized changes in the work that are so
extensive as to impair the integrity of the original work
constitute copyright infringement." 172 The Gilliam court
justified its holding by stating that presenting a
distorted version of the work to the public should be
recognized as declaring a cause of action under the Lanham
Act § 43(a). 173 Thus, the decision in Gilliam stated that:
"American copyright law, as presently written, does
not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of
action for their violation, since the law seeks to
vindicate the economic, rather than the personal,
rights of authors. Nevertheless, the economic
incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that
serves as the foundation for American copyright law
mutilation in violation of the copyright license. In Gilliam, "the
group of British writers and performers known as Monty Python sued ABC
to enjoin their broadcasting of edited versions of three Monty Python
programs originally written and produced for the British Broadcasting
Corporation (the BBC) . Under its contract with the BBC, Monty Python
had broad rights to oversee changes in the scripts ; the BBC had the
right to make only 'minor changes' without the writers approval and
had no right to alter the programs after recording. The BBC, however,
did have the right to license overseas showings of the programs
.
Subject to the agreement, Monty Python retained all the rights in the
scripts. One of the Monty Python group members, Mr. Terry Gilliam,
brought suit against ABC, claiming that the broadcast of these
programs as edited would constitute an infringement of the group's
copyright in the underlying script, unfair competition, and a
violation of the group's moral right of integrity. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed with Gilliam and upheld the lower court's
grant of a preliminary injunction." See Anna S. White, The
Colorization Dispute: Moral Rights Theory as a Means of Judicial and
Legislative Reform, 38 Emory L. J. 237, at 263 (1989) .
172Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.04[A]
112Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24-25.
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cannot be reconciled with the inability of artists to
obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of
their work to the public on which the artists are
financially dependent. Thus, courts have long granted
relief for misrepresentation of an artist ' s work by
relying on theories outside the statutory law of
copyright .. .Although such decisions are clothed in
terms of proprietary right in one's creation, they
also properly vindicate the author's personal right to
prevent the presentation of his work to the public in
a distorted form. . . [Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act]
has been invoked to prevent misrepresentations that
may injure plaintiff ' s business or personal
reputation. .. It is sufficient to violate the Act that
a representation of a product, although technically
true, creates a false impression of the product '
s
origin. . .Thus, an allegation that a defendant has
presented to the public a 'garbled' distorted version
of plaintiff ' s work seeks to redress the very rights
sought to be protected by the Lanham Act, . . .and should
be recognized as stating a cause of action under that
statute. " 174
However, it is important to point out that even though
the court's language in Gilliam was very supportive of
moral rights protection for authors, the decision in
114Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24-25 (citations omitted)
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Gilliam ultimately relied on the contractual provisions and
the fact that the plaintiff was the owner of the copyright
in the underlying scripts . 175
D.- The Right of Retraction
The right of retraction permits the author, after
publication, to stop the further distribution of his work
or to make changes in it. 176 The right of retraction is the
analog to France's droit de retrait. 111 This right would
allow the author to prevent the exercise of copyright after
the transfer of the rights conferred by the copyright. In
terms of American copyright law, the right of retraction
would be protected only by the termination right, section
203 of the Copyright Act of 1976. 178
175Dana L. Burton, Artists' Moral Rights: Controversy and the Visual
Artists Rights Act, 48 SMU L. Rev. 639, at 650 (1995)
.
176Damich, supra note 56, at 7.
177Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.05[B]
178For a more pointed analysis of this issue, see Craig Joyce et al
.
,
Copyright Law § 5.02 (3d ed. 1994).
Chapter IV
Constitutionality of the Continental Moral Rights Doctrine
in the United States Copyright System
The continental author's rights system, based on
natural law principles, focuses on the authors' rights
without taking into consideration other rights that come
into play when a work is published. The fundamental goal
of the continental author's rights system is the protection
of the authors' rights: economic as well as personal
rights or moral rights. On the other hand, the essential
objective of the American copyright system is "[t]o promote
the Progress" 179 in the ultimate benefit of the society. 180
Therefore, the American copyright laws cannot focus only in
the authors' rights since the promotion of progress could
not be achieved without the dissemination of knowledge;
and, the true dissemination of knowledge is impossible
without the guarantee embodied in the free speech provision
of the First Amendment. Moreover, the dissemination of
knowledge could not be accomplished if the people's right
to learn is not guaranteed as well as the public access to
179Copyright Clause, supra note 18.
180
"The underlying purpose of the federal copyright system- -to promote
the Progress- -focuses more on social utility than on authors'
personalities." Ciolino, supra note 58, at 949.
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others' ideas. Thus, "a copyright may conflict with the
Constitution's protections of free speech when copyright is
used to inhibit the free flow of information." 181
In the same approach, the balance between the author's
natural property right and the people ' s natural right to
learn is only possible through the formulation of a
positive-law doctrine. 182 Since, in the case of the
American copyright system, the Constitution is the
foundation on which the positive-copyright-law doctrine is
based, we should consider not only the Copyright Clause but
also the First Amendment when analyzing all copyright
issues
.
In this chapter, this paper discusses that the
continental moral rights doctrine may conflict not only
with American copyright principles, such as the fair use
doctrine, but also with the First Amendment. The First
Amendment and the fair use doctrine, which are essential
elements in the American copyright system, have not been
contemplated either by the Berne Convention or by the
Continental Law System. Moreover, there are scholars who
disfavor more extensive protection of authors' moral
rights. These scholars consider that: first, "moral
-
rights laws would be doctrinally inconsistent with American
copyright law and property law that generally promote,
181Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 164
182See Patterson, supra note 45.
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rather than limit, commerce in information and property;
second, moral rights would threaten economic investment in
the arts and thus stifle artistic creativity; and third,
moral rights would breed cultural conservatism, threaten
editorial freedom, and grant artists unnecessarily broad
aesthetic vetoes." 183 Consequently, the moral rights
doctrine as known in the Civil Law Countries may be
unconstitutional in the United States copyright system.
I. - Fair use
The doctrine of fair use 184 , codified in § 107 of the
Copyright Act, is "the method chosen by lawmakers and
courts to deal with the tension between free speech and
copyright protection." 185 Moreover, since the statutory
copyright grants to the authors the copyright protection
for a specified period186 (with the exclusive privileges set
forth in § 106 of the Copyright Act) , the copyright term
"created a substantial risk to the public's accessibility
183Ciolino, supra note 58, at 957. See also generally, Kelly, supra
note 111; and Zimmermann, supra note 27.
184 Fair Use Doctrine, supra note 80
185The fair use doctrine "establishes the delicate balance between the
public's interest in access to a work and the copyright owner's
interest in profit, and has been seen by the courts as a method of
eliminating potential conflicts between copyright and free speech.
"
Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 165.
i86For ^3 duration of the copyright, see Sections 302-305 of the
Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 22.
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to the copyrighted work" 187 ; thus, the fair use doctrine "is
a means of resolving this problem by making the copyrighted
work accessible for learning." 188 Therefore, the fair use
doctrine is an important principle, which is used to
support the regulatory nature of copyright 189 , with the
function to allow the public's access to information.
The Continental Moral Rights Doctrine focuses on the
proprietary concept of copyright rather than on the
regulatory concept that the copyright has in the United
States system. 190 Therefore, in the American copyright
system, the copyright owner does not have complete control
over all possible uses of his work. 191 On the other hand,
the moral right doctrine allows the author to control the
use of his work even after the transfer of the copyright.
187Patterson, supra note 45, at 35
188Patterson, supra note 45, at 35
189
"The distinction between a proprietary and a regulatory concept of
copyright and its application to the public access goal of copyright
was originated by L. Ray Patterson, Professor of Law, [The University
of Georgia School of Law] . The public access problem in copyright law
is a result of treating copyright protection as property. An
application of copyright law focusing on the need for public access
for a particular work requires that copyright be viewed as a
'regulatory' concept, not a 'proprietary' concept. If a copyright is
treated as a piece of property the copyright owner is given extremely
expansive rights in the work, thus allowing the copyright owner to
substantially control public access to the work and have the power of
censorship over that work." Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 165-166.
190
"The Supreme Court acknowledged that copyright is a regulatory
concept created to promote public access to information in the
landmark case of Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)." Id.
191See Sony, 464 U.S. at 432.
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While the fair use doctrine makes a copyrighted work
accessible during the term of the copyright's protection,
the moral right of integrity could threaten the criticism
of a work because the author of the work could claim that
the critique about his work constitutes a distortion or
mutilation of his work. 192 Futhermore, while the "fair use
doctrine is the means by which the economic monopoly
granted to a copyright owner is made secondary to the
public's interest in the free flow of information" 193 , the
moral rights doctrine makes the author's control over the
work its principal axiom.
It is clear at this point that the Continental Moral
Rights Doctrine is incompatible with the American fair use
doctrine. However, the question arises regarding both the
Section 106A of the Copyright Act 194 and the common- law
protection of the author's right of personality.
The moral rights given by Section 106A of the
Copyright Act are subject to the fair use defense pursuant
to Section 107. However, "the House Report states that it
is unlikely that such a defense will be successful." 195
Moreover, Section 106A is unclear as to what specifically
192Criticism is one of the possible purposes that justify a fair use of
a copyrighted work. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1976) .
193Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 190-191.
194 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1976). See also supra note 99.
195Kelly, supra note 111.
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would constitute prejudice to the honor or reputation of
the artist. Hence, if a professor uses a work of visual
art in a classroom in order to teach, the author of the
work could claim that the use of his work is damaging his
honor and reputation.
In the case of the protection of the author's right of
personality through state common law theories and the
federal unfair competition law, the courts' analysis must
be considered in conjunction with the fair use doctrine and
the First Amendment principles in order to avoid
unconstitutional decisions.
II.- Idea-Expression Dichotomy
In the American copyright system, the idea-expression
dichotomy doctrine 196 has been seen as another means to
accomplish the Copyright Clause objective. Thus, Section
102 (b) of the Copyright Act 197 protects an author's
expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. The idea-
expression dichotomy doctrine balances the interests of the
author while maintaining a source of information for the
public and other authors. 198 The ideas are in the public
196See supra note 25.
197 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1976)
198Kelly, supra note 111.
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domain once they are published so that the public's access
to the ideas is guaranteed.
The Continental Moral Rights Doctrine is based on
natural rights principles that support the concept that the
author is the sole owner of his creation (including the
ideas since they are the product of the author's thoughts)
.
Therefore, the American idea-expression dichotomy doctrine
is incompatible with the moral rights doctrine, and its
application would be endangered by the moral rights
doctrine based on natural law rights.
III.- The First Amendment 199
The fundamental purpose of the American copyright
system is to promote progress by promoting the public's
access to the works in order to disseminate knowledge.
However, if we want to guarantee the freedom of access to
an author's ideas, we have to guarantee the freedom to
express these ideas. The purpose of the First Amendment is
to guarantee freedom of expression. Therefore, the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment are in fact parts
of the same constitutional policy. 200 The difference is
199U.S. Const, amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
200Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 171.
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that the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment each take
a distinct approach to the protection of public's access to
information. The First Amendment "uses political
protections, while the Copyright Clause uses an economic
incentive to authors to promote public access to
information." 201 Thus, both the Copyright Clause and the
First Amendment ensure not only the balance among the
different rights involved in the dissemination of knowledge
but also guarantee the final purpose of the American
copyright system.
The First Amendment principle of protection of the
free speech has not been contemplated either by the
Continental moral rights doctrine or by the Berne
Convention. Thus, the Continental moral rights doctrine,
which is recognized by the Berne Convention, has never
taken into consideration the relationship that exists
between the protection of the author's rights and the
public's access to information and, thus, knowledge.
Therefore, in the moral rights doctrine, it is not an issue
that the author could be able to control the public access
to his work by exercising a perpetual, inalienable, and
imprescriptible proprietary right over his work and his
ideas. However, in the American copyright system, if the
201Political protections are those "enforced by the courts and by
legislative actions as opposed to any economic incentive. The
economic incentive created by a copyright is in the form of protection
of an author's profit as provided by the copyright laws." Zimmermann,
supra note 27, at 170.
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"copyright owner is able to control public access to a
work, he [could be] in violation of the Constitution's
guarantee of freedom of expression as well as the Copyright
Clause's goal of promotion of public access." 202
In conclusion, the moral rights doctrine conflicts
with the Constitution's protections of free speech as
embodied in the First Amendment. Hence, when the moral
rights are used to inhibit the free flow of information,
its use may be unconstitutional.
IV.- The Moral Rights Characteristics
Pursuant to the Author's right system, the moral
rights are perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible.
These characteristics are incompatible with the American
copyright system.
The Copyright Clause only authorizes for "limited
Times" the statutory protection of the authors' rights. 203
Thus, Congress is given by the Copyright Clause a broad
basis for determining the duration of the copyright
protection. However, any federal statute enacted under the
Copyright Clause, which granted a moral right in
perpetuity, would be unconstitutional. 204 Therefore, the
202Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 186.
203U.S. Const. Art I, § 8, cl . 8. See supra note 18.
204i'Penn, supra note 152, at 1036.
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perpetual characteristic of the moral rights doctrine would
be incompatible with the American copyright system.
Furthermore, the rights granted by the American statutory-
copyright-law are alienable and prescriptible
.
Chapter V
Conclusions
In order to achieve an international framework which
could provide a minimum standard of protection for its
copyrightable works, the United States acceded to the Berne
Convention, and Congress passed the Berne Convention
Implementation Act. The Berne Convention provides the
highest copyright protection available at the international
level. However, the adherence of the United States to this
treaty has caused some controversy especially in the moral
rights field. Thus, the adherence of the United States to
the Berne Convention has brought a clash of the two systems
involved in the international copyright field: the
Copyright system, and the Author's Rights system.
Despite the efforts of the United States in the
international copyright field, some countries in Europe and
in Latin America claim that the copyright system in the
United States does not protect in an appropriate way the
personal rights of authors or moral rights. However, this
critique and misunderstanding regarding the protection of
the moral rights in the United States is produced by a
wrong interpretation of the differences between the
American copyright system and the Continental author's
rights system. The Berne Convention's countries should
64
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consider that, in the case of moral rights, there are
philosophical and constitutional differences between the
American copyright law and the Civil law countries system.
Therefore, an understanding of the real objectives of the
American constitutional copyright provision, and the
particular characteristics of the United States copyright
system will enable Congress to avoid, in the moral rights
field, future amendments to the American copyright law that
may be unconstitutional.
The Berne Convention moral rights are based on natural
law principles. The natural rights approach adopted in the
Continental law system sustains that the "authors always
retained their personal or moral rights even if they sold
their economic rights." 205 Thus, the ultimate purpose of
the author's rights or Droit d' Auteur system is the
inviolability of an author's personality. On the other
hand, the ultimate purpose of the American copyright system
is "to promote the Progress of Science" 206 or, in other
words, to encourage the production of "science and useful
arts" 207 as a means "to promote the Progress" 208 and the
welfare of the nation. Hence, in the American copyright
law, the economic protection provided to the owner of the
copyright is the means of the copyright law not its goal
.
205Burger, supra note 30, at 6.
206U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl . 8. See supra note 18
207Jd
206 Id.
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Consequently, the purpose of the Continental moral rights
doctrine is incompatible with the American copyright
system.
American copyright system found that the author's act
of publication brings into play the rights of others. In
consequence, the Framers of the Constitution faced the fact
that two different natural law concepts came into conflict:
that of the author's natural property right, and the
people's natural right to learn. 209 Thus, the only method
available to balance two different natural laws in
conflict, without placing one above the other, is through
the creation of a positive-law doctrine. In the case of
the American copyright system, the Constitution is the
foundation in which the positive -copyright -law doctrine is
based. Thus, the natural -property-right of the authors
ends at publication by constitutional command. In this
way, American common law copyright does recognize the
natural-law-rights of the authors which could sustain the
moral rights doctrine as it is understood in the
Continental author's rights system. Nevertheless, the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution does not provide
either for the continuation of the common- law copyright or
the continuation of the authors' natural rights embodied in
the common-law copyright; however, the Copyright Clause
created a new statutory right by its own constitutional
209See Patterson, supra note 45.
authority. Therefore, the natural law theory, in which the
moral rights doctrine is based, is inapplicable in the
United States copyright system as it was recognized by the
United States Supreme Court decision in Wheaton v.
Peters210 .
The purpose of the Copyright Clause is to balance the
different natural laws in conflict in order to promote the
progress of the society. However, the Copyright Clause is
not enough to ensure the complete balance required by the
important rights involved in the copyright field.
Therefore, the ultimate goal of the copyright (to promote
the progress by promoting the public's access to the works
in order to disseminate knowledge) is clearly meaningless
if with this freedom of access to the knowledge does not
also come the freedom to express the ideas and the
knowledge which is guaranteed by the First Amendment. 211
The First Amendment principle of protection of the
free speech has not been contemplated either by the
Continental moral rights doctrine or by the Berne
Convention. Thus, the Continental moral rights doctrine,
which is recognized by the Berne Convention, has never
taken into consideration the relationship that exists
between the protection of the author's rights and the
public's access to information and, thus, knowledge.
21033 U.S. (8 Peters) 374 (1834).
211Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 164
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Therefore, the moral rights doctrine conflicts with the
Constitution's protections of free speech as embodied in
the First Amendment.
After the analysis made in this paper, it can be
stated that the Continental moral rights doctrine is also
incompatible with both the American fair use doctrine 212 and
the idea-expression dichotomy doctrine 213 .
The only idea that connects American right of
personality and the concept of moral rights in the
Continental legal system is that the works are expressions
of the creative personality of the authors, and insofar as
these works represent the authors' personalities, the works
should be protected. However, because of the
philosophical differences between the American copyright
law and the author's rights system, the U.S. consistently
has refused to recognize moral rights, as such, but through
various common law doctrines, such as defamation,
misrepresentation, the right of privacy, the right of
publicity, unfair competition, and federal claims such as
section 43 (a) of the Lanham act 214
, courts frequently have
upheld claims of moral right. 215 Therefore, it can be said
212For the analysis of this issue, see Chapter IV, Section I of this
paper
.
213For a more pointed analysis of this issue, see Chapter IV, Section
II of this paper.
214Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051 et seq.
215See generally Damich, supra note 56; and Davis, supra note 97.
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that the U.S. does fulfill the minimum standard of moral
rights' protection which the Berne Convention requires.
Nevertheless, the courts' analysis of the common law and
the federal unfair competition actions must be done in
accordance with the need of balance and the alliance that
exists between the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment. Otherwise, the courts' analysis may be also
unconstitutional
.
Finally, after all the considerations made in this
paper, it concludes that the moral rights concept, as
understood in the Civil Law Countries, may be
unconstitutional in the United States copyright system.
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